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1 Hines and Willard (1992) empirically examined the number of treaties a country signs as well as
the tax concessions dictated by a particular treaty.  However, they do not include the amount of FDI
activity as an explanatory variable nor do they consider the effect of taxation on FDI.  The United Nations
(1998) has studied the effects of bilateral treaties for the promotion and protection of FDI.  These treaties
are generally geared towards increasing investment in developing nations by ensuring a favorable
political and economic climate and do not address tax concerns.
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I. Introduction
Empirical studies on the effects of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI) are as numerous
and varied as the tax policies they study.  Until this point, however, the impacts of bilateral tax treaties
governing the taxation of FDI activity have been unexplored.1  Worldwide, there exists a network of over
2,000 treaties which affect the taxation of the large majority of FDI (Radaelli, 1997).  According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 1998), by 1998 these treaties covered approximately $774 billion of
U.S. investment abroad (outbound FDI) and $586 billion of foreign investment within the U.S. (inbound
FDI).  These amounts represented 78% of total U.S. outbound FDI and 96% of the total U.S. inbound
FDI.  
The introduction to the OECD’s model tax treaty states that a primary goal of a tax treaty is
“removing the obstacles that double taxation presents”, thus reducing its “harmful effects on the exchange
of goods and services and movements of capital, technology, and persons” (OECD, 1997, p. I-1).  Thus,
on the surface bilateral tax treaties appear designed to encourage FDI by lowering withholding taxes on
reparations to treaty partners and harmonizing tax laws.  Research by Altshuler and Newlon (1991), Hines
(1992), Altshuler, Newlon, and Randolph (1995), and Mutti and Grubert (1996) indicates that changes in
withholding taxes can affect both the timing of repatriation decisions and the mode of repatriation by
firms.  While this indicates that these treaties can affect profitability of existing foreign investors, it does
not necessarily say anything about the effects of these changes on overall FDI activity. 
Furthermore, there are several legal and economic arguments suggesting that treaties will have no
effect on FDI activity.  Dagan (2000) asserts that double taxation can be alleviated unilaterally just as
well as through a bilateral agreement, and that the actual intent of treaties is to reduce administration
2 Radaelli (1997) argues that, at least for the U.S., treaty formation is well-insulated from the
interests of business groups.
3 Unfortunately, the time frame of the data preclude us from credibly estimating the impact of tax
treaties with the U.S.’s largest FDI partners, as these treaties began in the decade after WWII and before
our sample begins.
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costs, reduce tax evasion, and to extract tax concessions from host countries.  In fact, Dagan goes so far as
to condemn the double taxation objective as “a myth” (p. 939).  Radaelli (1997) also asserts that U.S. tax
treaties are primarily geared towards reducing tax evasion rather than promoting FDI.  In addition to this
concern is the possibility that these treaties stem primarily from rent-seeking lobbying efforts by current
foreign investors, rather than from a desire by governments to reduce distortions and enhance efficiency. 2 
Finally, it is not clear that reducing firm’s withholding tax burdens would necessarily impact the amount
of investment.  Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1993) point out that, since withholding taxes are only paid
upon repatriation, it is less expensive to expand an overseas affiliate through retained earnings than
through repatriated and re-exported funds.  Because of this, they contend that only mature, non-expanding
foreign affiliates will repatriate earnings.  As a result, they predict that withholding taxes may have no
effect on the size of FDI activity.  
These varied arguments indicate that the effect of bilateral tax treaties on the amount of FDI
between the U.S. and partner countries is an open question.  The answer is of particular importance in
light of the efforts expended by the U.S. Treasury to negotiate the treaties, as well as the necessary
ratification by the U.S. Senate. This paper makes a first attempt at answering this question by estimating
the impact of bilateral tax treaties on both U.S. inbound and U.S. outbound FDI over the period from
1966 to 1992.   The sample we construct represents easily the most comprehensive set of consistent data
on FDI used in the literature to date and allows us to examine the impact of new bilateral tax treaties for a
wide variety of U.S. partner countries that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. 3  We explore tax treaty
effects on two measures of overall FDI activity: sales by foreign affiliates and FDI stocks.  Our empirical
framework for testing the determinants of FDI activity is one recently developed by Carr, Markusen and
3Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (1999a,1999b).  As opposed to the traditional gravity model
which is driven by the data, this framework is more strongly based on the established theory of
multinational enterprises.   
Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, we find no evidence that bilateral tax
treaties increase FDI activity, contrary to OECD-stated goals for such treaties.  In fact, for certain
specifications, our estimates suggest that for our sample there may be economically and statistically
significant negative effects of new bilateral tax treaties on U.S. outbound activity to the tax treaty partner
country.  This suggests that, rather than opening the floodgates for new FDI, treaties may reduce the
incentive for some firms to engage in FDI, possibly due to the elimination of opportunities for transfer
pricing and tax evasion.  We further find that this negative effect on outbound FDI activity occurs as a
one-time drop in the growth of FDI activity in the treaty year with no significant ramifications in
subsequent years, and that this negative effect is fairly consistent across the countries that negotiated
bilateral tax treaties with the U.S. during the period of our sample.  Thus, at best, our results find no
support for the idea the tax treaties increase FDI and that they may instead have much the opposite effect. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II, we discuss U.S. tax treaties including their history,
how they are formed, and their key functions.  In Section III, we present our empirical methodology and
data.  Section IV presents our results and section V concludes.
II.  Tax Treaties
In this section, we briefly discuss the history and functions of bilateral tax treaties.  Given our
paper’s focus, this section concentrates on these issues from a U.S. perspective; however, most of the
discussion applies to other countries as well. The process of creating an international tax treaty with the
U.S. is the same as for other international treaties.  The Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy and the
International Tax Counsel, acting on behalf of the Department of the Treasury, undertake the actual treaty
4 Since tax treaties are federal instruments, they supercede state or local laws.  Generally, the only
limitation U.S. tax treaties place on state taxation is that a foreign corporation must be treated the same as
a firm incorporated in another state (White, 1991).
5 The original draft of the U.S./Cyprus treaty was signed in 1981 but did not pass the Senate.  An
amended version also failed in 1985.  In 1987, a final version of the treaty was signed but was not ratified
until 1988.
6 The treaty with South Africa was terminated as part of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act
of 1987.  It was reinstated in 1997.  The U.S./U.S.S.R. treaty, which was officially terminated in 1992,
has been extended to cover former Soviet block countries until individual treaties can be negotiated. The
only terminated treaty which was not canceled by the U.S. was that with Honduras.  This treaty
eliminated withholding taxes on FDI by both countries.  Due to the almost entirely one-way nature of FDI
flows, Honduras felt that all gains from the treaty were accruing to the U.S. and terminated it in 1967
(Diamond and Diamond, 1998).
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negotiation.  After the treaty is signed by the President or his delegate, it proceeds to the Senate.  There,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings before the treaty proceeds to the full Senate for
ratification.4  Not all signed treaties receive Senate approval.  For example the Bangladeshi treaty was
signed in 1981 but failed in the Senate.  Some treaties fail multiple times before they are finally ratified.5  
Once ratified, treaties usually remain in effect, although most contain provisions for termination after a
six-month notification by either nation (Doernberg, 1997).  Of those treaties allowed to lapse, the
majority (Aruba, Malta, and the Netherlands-Antilles) were the result of insufficient attempts by partner
nations to prevent treaty shopping, a practice in which investments are funneled through a treaty country
by a third nation for the purpose of avoiding or reducing taxes.6  As with many types of international
agreements, the number of tax treaties the U.S. has in force is on the rise.  Table 1, which lists U.S. treaty
partners, shows that the U.S. has gone through three major waves of treaty negotiations.  The first
followed WWII and saw the U.S. complete treaties with its major economic partners: the western
European countries, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.  The second wave of the late 70's and
early 80's focused on a wider variety of countries, including China, Egypt, Korea, India, Indonesia, the
Phillippines, and Spain.  More recently, beginning in the early 1990's, the fall of the former Soviet Union
has led to additional U.S. treaty activity with respect to many of the former Soviet Bloc countries. 
7 The U.S. has also entered into tax information exchange agreements with countries which are
not tax treaty partners.  Additionally, the U.S. has ratified the multilateral OECD Convention on Mutual
Assistance in Tax Matters which provides for information exchange (OECD, 1989).
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Overall, the pace of new treaty implementation has increased.  In fact, half of the treaties currently in
force were ratified only in the past twenty years with over 20% of the current treaties implemented during
the 1990's alone. 
Tax treaties perform four primary functions.  The first is to standardize tax definitions and
solidify the tax jurisdictions of treaty partners.  It is common practice that only income generated by
foreigners through a permanent establishment in the host country is subject to host taxation.  If the
countries differ in their definitions of permanent establishments, this can lead to double taxation and
inefficient capital flows (Hamada, 1966). The impact of differing tax definitions on FDI is explored
theoretically by Janeba (1996).  Hines (1988) finds that the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which revised U.S.
definitions, had a significant effect on U.S. multinationals (MNEs).  Since a common goal for tax treaties
is to reduce double taxation and the inefficiencies it causes, standardization of tax definitions and
jurisdictions is a powerful tool.  Treaty tax definitions generally match those provided by the OECD’s
model tax treaty (OECD, 1997).  A second role for a tax treaty is to promote the exchange of tax
information.  This improves a treaty partner’s ability to enforce its enforcing tax laws.  This provision is
particularly relevant for multinational corporations due to their ability to engage in transfer pricing to
avoid taxation.7  The third goal of tax treaties, especially recent treaties, is to prevent treaty shopping. 
According to Radaelli (1997), concerns over treaty shopping have prompted the U.S. to renegotiate many
of its older treaties as well.  Although there are many variations in the regulations regarding treaty
shopping, the most common rules restrict treaty benefits if more than 50% of a corporation’s stock is held
by a third, non-treaty country’s residents (Doernberg, 1997).
Finally, tax treaties affect the actual taxation of multinationals.  They do so through the rules
affecting double taxation relief and the withholding taxes levied on repatriations by FDI.  Following the
8 Under a tax credit, the domestic tax bill is calculated by applying the standard domestic tax rate
to the pre-foreign tax level of overseas profits.  A credit against this amount is then applied up to the
amount of the foreign taxes paid.  If this credit exceeds the domestic tax liability, the firm is in an “excess
credit” position and pays no additional taxes on these overseas profits.  If the home tax bill is greater than
the amount of the credit, the firm is in an “excess limit” position and pays the remaining amount to the
home government. 
9 For instance, Belgium applies a reduced domestic tax rate to the foreign-earned profits of its
residents.  Under the U.S./Belgium treaty, however, income earned by Belgian firms in the U.S. is exempt
from Belgian taxation. 
10 Note that a lower foreign tax rate does not guarantee a reduction in the firm’s total tax bill.  As
noted by Altshuler and Newlon (1991), only firms in excess credit will benefit from this change.  Thus, a
decrease in the overseas tax rate may not improve capital flows.  Also, as discussed by Ramaswami
(1968) and Bond and Samuelson (1989), this effect may be to the detriment of the home country due to
foreign factor market effects.
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OECD model treaty guidelines, tax treaties with the U.S. specify that both countries must offer either
foreign tax credits when calculating the domestic tax bill or exempt foreign-earned profits from domestic
taxation.8  This does not usually affect U.S. tax policy as it already provides foreign tax credits to its
investors whether their income is earned in a treaty or a non-treaty country.  It does, however, affect the
taxation of some treaty partners.9  In addition to the provisions for double taxation relief, the treaties also
often reduce maximum allowable withholding taxes on three types of remitted income: dividend
payments, interest payments, and royalty payments.  There are no tax treaties which raise tax rates.
From the above discussion, the primary costs and benefits of entering into a tax treaty can be
summarized as follows.  Since a treaty can lower the overseas taxes, more income is repatriated to the
home nation.  At the same time, lower overseas tax rates can promote a more efficient global allocation of
investment.10  This gain is accompanied by potentially reduced tax receipts since treaties also lower the
tax rates levied on inbound investment.  This cost can be mitigated in two ways.  First, improved
information exchange may reduce tax evasion.  It can also reduce the administrative costs associated with
enforcement and tax collection.  Second, since withholding taxes can be tailored to the specific
investment from a treaty partner, it may be possible to set tax rates which encourage tax-sensitive inbound
11 As derived in Bond and Samuelson (1989) among others, the tax revenue maximizing tax rate
on inbound FDI is 1/(1+,), where , is the elasticity of inbound FDI supply.  If , varies across countries,
the revenue maximizing tax rate will differ across countries.  Since a treaty allows a country to lower its
tax rate, this can actually raise tax revenues if the current tax rate is greater than the optimal tax on FDI
from that particular country.
12 For an explanation of transfer pricing, see Caves (1993).  Graham and Krugman (1995)
provides examples of firms recently prosecuted for transfer pricing by the U.S.
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investment and actually raise total tax receipts.11   Finally, a tax treaty, regardless of its specific terms, can
promote investment by reducing uncertainty about the overseas tax environment.  Since a treaty can
signal a willingness for governments to work out differences, this may boost investor confidence which
leads to increased willingness to export capital.
These treaty provisions, however, can cut both ways and may instead reduce the incentive to
engage in FDI.  If firms maximize after-tax profits, some of them may choose to operate in multiple
countries in an effort to reduce their taxes.  For example, it is well known that multinational firms can
minimize their tax burden through transfer pricing.12  By manipulating the price of goods traded between
their various subsidiaries, firms can shift profits to low tax locations.  This provides an incentive to invest
in those low tax locations in order to shield profits from taxes.  This was the argument put forth by
Casson (1979).  A treaty which reduces the ability to transfer price also reduces the incentive to invest for
tax minimization reasons.  Additionally, because treaties streamline the tax environment and encourage
the exchange of tax information, a treaty may make it easier for governments to reduce other types of tax
evasion, such as misrepresentation.  Therefore, to the extent that some firms engage in FDI simply to
minimize taxes, tax treaties may reduce FDI activity, not increase it.  Thus, the effects of tax treaties on
FDI activity is an open question, and we next turn to the data to estimate these effects for U.S. FDI
activity.
III.  Empirical Methodology and Data
   A. Empirical Methodology
8To estimate the effect of U.S. bilateral tax treaties, we need an empirical model of MNE/FDI
activity that reasonably captures the effect of other factors.  While variations of a gravity model have
arguably been the most popular empirical framework for examining FDI activity across countries, it lacks
connection to a recognized formal theory of MNE activity.  In contrast, recent papers by Carr, Markusen,
and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (1999a, 1999b) establish empirical models of FDI activity
that are arguably more grounded in the formal theories of MNE activity that have been developed in the
past fifteen years.  In particular, Markusen and Maskus provide an “unrestricted” empirical model of
MNE/FDI activity that nests a number of alternative theories of MNE activity.  The theories nested in
their empirical framework include horizontal MNE models, vertical MNE models, and the knowledge-
capital MNE model which integrates the horizontal and vertical MNE models.  Markusen and Maskus
(1999b) use their empirical model to examine affiliate sales of U.S. firms in other countries and foreign
affiliate sales in the U.S. over the period 1986-1994.  Their unrestricted specification fits their data quite
well and, in general, finds support for the horizontal MNE theoretical model.  The Markusen and Maskus
(or M-M) empirical model is specified by the following equation:
(1)     
            
The first five independent variables on the right hand side of equation (1) are the variables
specific to the M-M framework.  The first two terms are relatively straightforward, with SUMGDP
defined as the sum of the two countries’ real GDPs, and GDPDIFSQ defined as the squared difference
between the two countries’ real GDP.  If horizontal MNEs are responsible for most FDI activity, then
there is an expected positive correlation between SUMGDP and FDI activity and an expected negative
correlation between GDPDIFSQ and FDI activity.  The intuition is that with some positive level of trade
frictions, larger and more similar sized markets better support the higher fixed costs associated with
setting up production across countries (versus exporting) and lead to greater MNE activity.  
13 In our regressions, this variable will almost always take the value of “1” when we examine U.S.
outbound data, because this suggests the U.S. is relatively skilled-labor abundant relative to the host
country.  Likewise, it will often take the value of “0” when our dependent variable is inbound FDI
activity because the U.S. is the host country in such a circumstance.
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The third, fourth and fifth terms on the right-hand side of equation (1) are more complicated
interaction terms.  D2SKDGDPD is an interaction term between three variables; D2, SKD, and GDPD. 
D2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the parent country for MNE activity is relatively
skilled-labor abundant to the host country, SKD is the difference in relative skilled-labor abundance
between the two countries, and GDPD is the real GDP difference between the two countries.13  Markusen
and Maskus (1999b) argue that this coefficient will have a negative sign if the knowledge capital model is
an accurate picture of MNE activity, and will be insignificant if the other alternative MNE models
(horizontal and vertical) are more realistic.  D2SKDSUMG is another interaction term that is perhaps the
most important variable distinguishing between the alternative MNE models.  This variable interacts D2
and SKD (as defined above) with SUMGDP.  This variable is hypothesized to have a positive sign if the
vertical or knowledge capital MNE models fit the data, but a negative sign if the horizontal MNE model
is a better fit.  The main intuition behind these differences is that greater skill differences generate greater
MNE activity in the vertical model.  In contrast, greater skill differences negatively impact horizontal
MNE formation as the cost of skilled labor goes up in the skilled labor country from increasing
differences, making it more difficult to compete against national firms in the skilled-labor scarce country. 
The knowledge capital model has aspects of the vertical model that means skill differences can positively
affect MNE activity as well.  Finally, D1SKDSUMG identifies the symmetrically opposite effects of
D2SKDSUMG for the situation when the parent country is relatively skilled-labor scarce.  It does this by
interacting a dummy variable that takes the value of “-1” when the parent is relatively skilled labor scarce
and interacts it with SKD and SUMGDP.  Table 2 summarizes expected signs of the variables the M-M
framework. 
In addition to the variables just described, the M-M framework also includes additional control
14 We also tried including a squared trend term which does not affect qualitatively affect our
coefficients of interest.  Below we also discuss results from other extensions to our specification which
further capture time dimensions of our data, including country-specific time trends and first differences. 
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variables.  First, distance (DISTANCE) is included to proxy for transport and other trade costs that will
affect a firm’s decision about whether to become an MNE.  Second, trade openness for both the parent
and host countries (T_OPENi and T_OPENj ) affect the MNE’s ability to trade intermediates and final
goods, which then affects the location of MNEs.  Greater openness in the host country should lower FDI
activity because it lowers trade frictions and makes exporting more attractive.  Greater openness in the
parent country should increase FDI, since it makes it easier to ship goods back to the parent country from
foreign affiliates.  FDI openness of the host country (F_OPEN) proxies for the costs of setting up an
MNE, with greater openness expected to increase FDI activity.  Finally, all regressions include a trend
term.14
We use this empirical M-M framework as our main specification to examine effects of bilateral
tax treaties.  However, we note that we get qualitatively similar results for the impact of tax treaties when
using a gravity-type regression.  Although these results have been omitted for space, they are available
upon request.
As discussed earlier, tax treaties may alter investment incentives in a variety of ways. 
Unfortunately, most of these are difficult to quantify, and it is unclear how important the few quantifiable
aspects are for the overall tax treaty effect.  Thus, we begin with inclusion of a simple binary variable in
the M-M empirical framework that takes the value of “1” when a U.S. treaty is in place for a given partner
country and year to examine bilateral tax treaty effects.  From this initial examination, however, we
employ a variety of alternative specifications of this bilateral tax treaty variable that explores the
hetereogeneity of tax treaty effects across countries and over time.   
One additional concern is endogeneity of our dependent variable and the tax treaty variable. The
U.S. may be negotiating treaties with only the countries for which there are large and/or increasing
15 Table 3 also reports that for a number of countries, primarily former Soviet Bloc countries, data
on FDI activity with the U.S. is unavailable.  Thus, these countries are not part of our estimation.
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amounts of FDI activity.  Such an endogeneity problem would bias our coefficient on tax treaties upwards
and possibly cause a spurious positive correlation.  In our sample, there are two types of US treaty
partners: those with which the U.S. has had a bilateral tax treaty well before our sample begins, which we
call old treaty partners, and those with which treaties are negotiated during our sample that spans mainly
the 1970s and 1980s, which we call the new treaty partners.   Endogeneity problems are likely largest
with the old treaty partners: Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the western European countries. 
However, since these treaties were in place well before our sample begins, we are already skeptical about
our ability to separately identify tax treaty effects on FDI activity from other uncontrolled factors.  Thus,
our focus will be on the effects for new treaty countries, and for these partners there is little evidence of
an endogeneity problem, as we next show.
Table 3 lists the new treaty countries, where they rank in terms of total FDI activity with the U.S.
relative to other countries at the time of the treaty, as well as how many countries that were ranked ahead
of the country did not yet have a bilateral tax treaty with the U.S.15  Table 3 clearly shows that the U.S.
was not pursuing a strategy of signing bilateral tax treaties with countries that had the largest FDI activity
with the U.S. during this period (1970-1990).  As our estimates show below, these were also not countries
that were suddenly experiencing new growth in FDI activity with the U.S.  To the extent that one may
believe endogeneity exists to bias our coefficient toward showing a positive relationship between new tax
treaties and FDI, the negative effects we report below are even more surprising.
On a final note, we run empirical specifications on separate samples of U.S. outbound and U.S.
inbound FDI activity.  This allows us to examine whether bilateral tax treaties asymmetrically impact
outbound FDI of U.S. firms versus FDI into the U.S. by foreign firms.
    B. Data
16 Grubert and Mutti (1991) examine a cross-section of 33 countries for 1982, while Brainard
(1997) samples U.S.-country-industry combinations across 63 tradeable industries and 27 countries for
1989.  Markusen and Maskus (1999a, 1999b) examine an unbalanced panel data set of 36 U.S.-country
pairs from 1986-1994.  In contrast, this study examines an unbalanced panel of over 60 countries for up to
27 years.
17 We discuss results from two other alternative measures of FDI activity, FDI flows and the
number of affiliates, below.
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Empirical FDI studies have always been hampered by data difficulties.  Missing or incomplete
data for one or more variables often leads researchers to examine cross-sectional data, with little or no
time series dimension.16  Data issues are also why researchers generally focus on U.S. data, as it is more
complete and detailed than virtually any other countries’ FDI statistics.  Our approach is to collect data on
inbound and outbound U.S. FDI activity for as many years as possible across as many countries as
available.  As a result, we have an unbalanced panel of 65 countries spanning up to 27 years – from 1966
through 1992 – depending on the particular dependent variable we employ.  The ending date of 1992 was
due to two data constraints.  First, 1992 is the final reported year of the Penn-World Tables, which was an
important source for a number of our study’s independent variables.  Second, the World Bank data we use
to measure skill difference across countries ends around this time as well.  Our ability to go back in time
with our sample was typically constrained by reported years of U.S. FDI activity, our dependent variable,
as we describe more below. 
Following previous studies, we initially use affiliate sales in the host country as our indicator of
FDI activity.   However, statistics on affiliate sales activity are not available for nearly as many years as
another indicator of FDI activity: FDI stock.   Outbound FDI stock data go back as far as 1966 in some
cases, whereas affiliate sales data are only available back to 1983 for outbound affiliate sales and 1984 for
inbound affiliate sales.  As one would guess, there are strong, statistically-significant correlations between
affiliate sales and FDI stock: In our sample, the pairwise correlation is 0.88 for inbound FDI activity and
0.92 for outbound FDI.  Thus, we also use FDI stock as an alternative dependent variable, as this allows
us to substantially increase our sample observations.17  Both FDI activity variables are collected from
13
official BEA data available at the BEA’s Internet site.  We converted all FDI variables into thousands of
real U.S. dollars using the U.S. GDP deflator as reported in the Economic Report of the President.  A data
appendix provides more details on these variables, as well as the other variables we employ in our study.
With respect to our independent variables, data on real GDP come from the Penn-World Tables. 
We also use these data to construct the M-M variables, SUMGDP, GDPDIFSQ, D2SKDGDPD, and
D2SKDSUMG.  The latter two variables also require data on skilled-labor differences between countries. 
For this we rely on a relatively new database constructed by World Bank researchers on total mean years
of education across countries from 1950-1990.  We use the difference in total mean years of education
between the parent and host country as our measure of SKD (skilled-labor abundance difference), and D2
takes the value of “1” when the parent country has a higher total mean years of education.  This differs
from the data used by Markusen and Maskus (1999b) in construction of these variables related to skilled
labor abundance.  They use data from annual surveys conducted by the International Labour Organization
to construct measures of skilled labor to total employment by country and year.  These data were not
available for many earlier years in our sample and, in addition, there were changes in how occupations
were categorized into occupation types over time.
The main additional control variables we employ are distance (DISTANCE), trade openness
(T_OPEN) and FDI openness (F_OPEN).  Distance data come from the Bali Online Corporation (1999),
while T_OPEN is taken from the Penn-World Tables and is defined as the ratio of the sum of imports and
exports to GDP.  Markusen and Maskus (1999b) use investment impediment indexes reported by the
World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum to measure F_OPEN.  Since these data
cover a relatively small set of years, we instead constructed an alternative F_OPEN measure defined as
the host country’s FDI stock net of any U.S.-owned FDI stock (to avoid endogeneity concerns) divided
by its GDP.  This is similar in construction to commonly-used trade openness measures.  We only used
this F_OPEN variable for our U.S. outbound FDI activity specifications, since such a measure for U.S.
inbound FDI activity would not have any cross-sectional variation and just measure changes in U.S. FDI
14
openness over time, which is highly correlated with the trend term that we include.  Finally, information
on U.S. bilateral tax treaties were collected from Diamond and Diamond (1998).
IV. Results
    A. Initial Results
Table 4 presents estimates for determinants of both inbound and outbound affiliate sales using the
M-M specification with various tax treaty variables.  We note that when we use U.S. inbound FDI data,
subscript (i) refers to the foreign parent country and subscript (j) refers to the United States (the host
country), while when we use U.S. outbound FDI data, subscript (i) refers to the United States (the parent
country) and subscript (j) refers to the foreign host country.  We begin with a specification that includes
only a simple binary variable for whether the observation involves a treaty country or not, with column
(1) displaying these results for inbound affiliate sales and column (4) displaying these results for
outbound affiliate sales. For both samples, the data fit the overall model reasonably well with R2s around
0.65 and an F-test statistic that rejects the null of zero slopes at the one percent significance level.  In fact,
the primary variables of the M-M model (SUMGDP, GDPDIFSQ, D2SKDGDPD, D2SKDSUMG, and
D1SKDSUMG) are generally statistically significant and have predicted signs for a world that is
dominated by horizontal MNEs.  In other words, despite differences in sample and construction of some
variables, our results are consistent with Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2001) and Markusen and Maskus
(1999a, 1999b) and suggest that horizontal MNEs are more prevalent than vertical MNEs.
Our variable of interest, capturing bilateral tax treaty effects, displays quite different results for
inbound and outbound activity.  On average, there appears to be little effect of bilateral tax treaties on
inbound U.S. affiliate sales, but a statistically and economically significant effect on U.S. outbound
affiliate activity.  The estimate on outbound FDI activity suggests treaty partners have an additional $8.2
billion in affiliate sales annually per country, which compares to an overall annual average of $15.8
18 An earlier draft of this paper (Blonigen and Davies, 2000) also found no significant effect for
the simple treaty dummy variable.  In that version, we then moved towards a “treaty age” variable to
measure vintage effects.  There, we found that older treaties were significantly and positively correlated
with FDI activity.  Initially, we attributed this to significant lag effects from the treaties.  Given the results
below, however, the evidence suggests that this effect is driven by the particular experience of the old
treaty countries.  Unfortunately, given the limitations of the data set, we cannot say more on the effects of
older treaties.
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billion.  This effect seems unusually high.  A major concern is that this effect is being dominated by the
old treaty partner countries, which are essentially the western European countries, Canada, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand.  Despite the M-M control variables, the treaty variable may just be picking
up unobserved characteristics of the old treaty partners that mean the U.S. has substantially more FDI
activity with these countries regardless of any treaties in place. 
 We address these concerns in a number of ways.  First, we explore heterogeneous treaty effects
across new and old treaty partners.  Columns (2) and (5) in Table 4 examine results for inbound and
outbound affiliate sales, respectively, when we replace the treaty dummy variable with a new treaty
dummy and an old treaty dummy.  The results are startling.  The coefficients on the new treaty country
dummy variable are now negative and statistically significant.  On the other hand, the effects for the old
treaty partners are similar to the overall effects estimated in columns (1) and (4), except that the
magnitude of the treaty variable for the U.S. outbound affiliate activity is now over twice as large.18  This
still leaves the concern that unobserved differences not accounted for by the M-M framework are driving
the coefficient estimates on the two treaty variables. 
The obvious way to control for possible unobserved factors is to include time-invariant
unobserved country-partner-specific fixed effects and columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 present estimates
when we include these fixed effects into our specification.  As one might guess, the fixed effects turn out
to be quite important with R2s now close to one and F-tests strongly supporting the inclusion of the fixed
effects.  However, the tradeoff is that, since bilateral tax treaties with old treaty partners occurred before
our sample begins, inclusion of these fixed effects precludes the estimation of an old treaty dummy
19 Credible estimation of the old treaty effects would first require consistent data on FDI activity
back to World War II at least.  In addition, one would have to control for the endogeneity issues, since
these old-treaty countries were clearly the U.S.’s main economic partners.  Finally, one would have to
control for the many economic factors, such as reconstruction after WWII, that were occurring at the
time. 
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variable.  Because these fixed effects are so important for fitting the data, we necessarily focus on
estimating treaty effects for only the new treaty partners in the rest of the paper, and concede that data
constraints do not allow us to credibly estimate treaty effects for old treaty partners.19
Once we control for country-partner-specific fixed effects, we find that the coefficients on the
new treaty dummy variable in columns (3) and (6) of Table 4 are still negative and statistically significant
for both U.S. inbound and outbound affiliate sales, though the magnitude falls by 40-50 percent.  The
estimated negative effects of treaties on FDI activity support to the notion that treaties are intended to
reduce tax evasion rather than promote new FDI.  Since some activity on the margin may be driven by the
ability to engage in transfer pricing or other types of evasion, a treaty which eliminates this ability could
lead to this result.  
In fact, despite the drop in magnitude of the coefficients from the column (2) and (5) estimates,
the column (3) and (6) estimates  indicate very large effects on FDI activity.  Column (3) estimates
suggest that a new treaty leads to annual loss of $9.7 billion in inbound affiliate sales which is
unreasonably large compared to an average of $284 million in annual inbound affiliate sales by new
treaty countries during our sample.  The estimated annual loss for a new treaty on outbound sales is $2.5
billion, which is a potentially more reasonable figure compared to an average of $4.0 billion in annual
outbound affiliate sales by new treaty countries during our sample.   In section IV.B. below we explore
alternative reasons for such large coefficient estimates and present modified M-M specifications that lead
to more reasonable results.  Before proceeding, however, we first verify that use of FDI stock data for our
dependent variable yields qualitatively identical results using these initial specifications.
As mentioned earlier, U.S. BEA data on affiliate sales only go back to the early 1980s, while FDI
20 In fact, China, Tunisia, Cyprus, Indonesia, India, and Spain are the only countries with new
treaties that begin after our affiliate sales data begin and before our sample ends.
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stock data go as far back as to 1966 in some cases.  Not only does the use of affiliate sales data limit the
number of observations, but another importance consequence of the much shorter time period is that, as
with the old partner treaty countries, the effects for new treaty partner countries that negotiated treaties in
the 1970s and early 1980s are completely captured in the country-partner-specific fixed effects -- not in
the new partner treaty variable.20  Using FDI stock as our dependent variable means a substantial increase
in observations and the time dimension of our data, particularly for outbound FDI activity.  Table 5
repeats results of Table 4 empirical specifications when using real FDI stock as the dependent variable,
rather than affiliate sales.  As with the affiliate sales data, the M-M framework fits both U.S. inbound and
outbound FDI stock data decently well, and again the coefficient estimates support the predictions of the
horizontal MNE theoretical model.  The treaty variables reveal a similar pattern to the affiliate sales
results as well.  The effects of bilateral tax treaties with the U.S. appear to have negative effects on U.S.
FDI activity with new treaty partner countries, even after controlling for country-partner-specific fixed
effects.  However, once again the estimated new treaty effects seem unreasonably large.  Inbound FDI
stock with new treaty partners is estimated to be $9.3 billion lower annually, even though the average
inbound stock for these countries is just $89 million.  Outbound FDI stock is estimated to be $880 million
lower as compared to an average of $911 million of outbound FDI stock in new treaty partner countries. 
  B. Alternative Specifications
The unreasonably large estimated new treaty effects leads to an exploration of modified M-M
empirical frameworks in this section.  The first modification we explore is allowing interactions between
the M-M control variables and a dummy variable that indicates whether the partner country is “rich” or
“poor”.  We define the “rich” countries as Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the western
European countries, which are also the old treaty partners of the U.S.  By constraining the coefficient on
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the M-M control variables to be identical across country pairs, we assume that changes in these variables
have the same effect for both rich and poor countries, which may not be correct.   If growth in M-M
variables, such as SUMGDP, translate into much larger increases in FDI activity for rich countries than
poor countries, the model will be overestimating how much growth in SUMGDP should increase FDI
activity for poor countries.  Thus, when one includes a new treaty variable for a poor country towards the
latter half of the time series, the coefficient may be biased negative to compensate.
This discussion also brings up the issue of time series problems in the data, which have not been
addressed in any previous papers using the M-M model.  Given an unbalanced panel of countries with
varying and short time series, there are no easy or standard ways of handling this issue.   A regression of
the dependent variables on its one-period lag results in very high and statistically significant coefficients,
even after controlling for other variables.  The control regressors are likely not stationary for many cross-
sectional units as well, despite being defined in real terms.  Thus, we modify our estimation in two ways.
In the first alternative, we continue to specify the regression in levels with fixed effects, but replace the
general time trend with country-partner specific time trends.  The second alternative is to estimate the
regression in first differences.  
Table 6 shows our results for inbound and outbound affiliate sales as we modify the M-M
framework to account for these issues.  Columns (1) and (4) of Table 6 show a specification when we add
country-specific time trends to our fixed effects model.  The M-M control variables perform similar to
before, but the impact on the new treaty variable is dramatic.  For inbound affiliate sales, the coefficient
falls from -$9.7 billion to -$525 million and is now statistically insignificant.  The new treaty coefficient
on outbound affiliate sales falls from -$2.5 billion to -$1.1 billion once country-specific trend terms are
included.
In columns (2) and (5), we continue to have country-specific trends, but also allow the
coefficients on SUMGDP, GDPDIFSQ, F_OPEN, T_OPENi and T_OPENj to differ across rich and poor
21 We do not interact D2SKDGDPD, D2SKDSUMG or D1SKDSUMG because the way they are
defined (particularly, whether they are more skilled labor abundant or not relative to the U.S.) precludes
any variation for the poor countries.  
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countries by interacting these variables with a “RICH COUNTRY” dummy variable.21  The results
strongly confirm that imposing identical coefficients on these M-M control variables across rich and poor
countries is incorrect.  The M-M controls, which without the interaction terms, are capturing only the
effects for poor countries, are now much smaller and imprecisely estimated.  However, combining these
effects with the interaction terms, we find large and precise estimates for the rich countries.  Thus, the
differences in explanatory power of the M-M variables for FDI activity across rich and poor countries is
highly significant, both statistically and in terms of magnitude.  In terms of inbound affiliate sales,
including the interaction terms substantially reduces the absolute size of the new treaty coefficient, which
is consistent with the explanation given above.  However, the new treaty coefficient for outbound sales
remains about the same, suggesting that heterogeneity across parent countries is a larger issue than across
host countries.  
In columns (3) and (6), we present results from estimating the model in first differences, while
continuing to include the M-M rich-poor country interactions.  The treaty variable is now a dummy
variable that takes the value of  “1” in the treaty year, and is, thus, capturing any one-time adjustments
that occur to FDI activity growth in the treaty year.  The fit of these first-differences specifications is
quite good with an R2 of 0.56 for the inbound affiliate sales data and one of 0.25 for the outbound affiliate
sales.   F-tests clearly reject the null of jointly zero slopes at the one percent level as well.  The M-M
variables generally perform as before in terms of signs and statistical significance.  In terms of the new
treaty coefficients, the effect of new treaties on inbound affiliate sales is estimated with a small negative
coefficient that is insignificant.  Similarly, the effect of new treaties on outbound affiliate sales is smaller
than before as well.
  Table 7 replicates Table 6 using FDI stock data rather than affiliate sales data, but despite the
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large differences in sample size and countries that are included in the new treaty effects, we get
qualitatively identical answers.  In particular, including rich-poor interaction terms and controlling for
time series concerns through either country-specific trends or first differences substantially reduces the
coefficients into ranges that seem reasonable given the average levels.  As with the affiliate sales
regressions, the first differences specification estimates negative effects of new treaties on FDI stock,
however, the effect on outbound FDI stock is statistically significant as well.  The estimates suggest that
new treaties lead to a drop of $188 million in outbound FDI stock, which is significant (but not
unreasonably large) relative to an average of $911 million of outbound FDI stock in new treaty partner
countries.
C. Exploring Year-by-Year New Treaty Effects
By specifying only a simple binary variable to capture the new-partner treaty effects for the levels
regressions, we assume that the new treaty effects are identical for all years after a treaty is in place.  By
specifying a dummy variable for only the treaty year when we first difference the data, we assume the
effects on FDI growth all take place in the treaty year.  With either specification we may be missing
important information on timing issues connected with these treaty effects.  For example, do these
negative treaty effects occur only in the year of the treaty or is there a dampening effect on activity for all
years after a treaty is in place?  Another issue is the possibility of anticipatory effects in the period before
the treaty is actually ratified and comes into place.  
Table 8 explores these issues by reporting estimates from a first differences specification where
we replace the new treaty binary variable with individual year effects for each year surrounding a treaty
(from 3 year prior to 5 years after).  This specification is similar in all other ways to that estimated in
columns (3) and (6) of Tables 6 and 7, therefore we only report the coefficients from the individual year
effects for the sake of space.  We note that this assumes that these individual year effects are identical
across the new treaty partner countries, but we discuss relaxing this assumption below.  The model is
estimated for both inbound and outbound activity for both affiliate sales and FDI stock data.
For the FDI stock data (columns (3) and (4) of Table 8) the effects are concentrated around the
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treaty year.  There is a large and statistically significant negative effect in the treaty year for outbound
FDI stock ($192 million drop) and a similar drop for inbound FDI stock ($266 million drop) in the year
after.  All other year effects in these FDI stock regressions are statistically insignificant.  The affiliate
sales regressions suggest a different picture.  The outbound affiliate sales results (column (2)) suggest a
number of statistically significant drops in the growth rate in the second through the fourth years after a
treaty is signed.  This may not be inconsistent with the FDI stock regressions if changes in affiliate sales
follow some lagged relationship with changes in FDI stock.  The inbound affiliate sales regressions show
statistically insignificant effects, except for statistically significant positive effects in the fourth and fifth
years after a treaty.
The overall message from the estimates reported in Table 8 is that for the inbound FDI activity
(whether using affiliate sales or FDI stock data), there are no statistically significant effects from the
treaties though there are generally negative coefficient for the individual year effects.  For the outbound
FDI activity, there is a statistically significant negative effect of the treaty in the particular year of the
treaty (and also for the year immediately after the treaty for affiliate sales), but no significant effects for
other years surrounding the treaty.  Thus, the important new piece of information we gain from Table 8 is
that these new-partner treaties seem to lead to one-time adjustments at the time of the treaty, but no
worsening of FDI activity after that.  This too is consistent with the story that treaties drive out firms who
engage in FDI in large part to exploit tax evasion possibilities.
D. Individual New Partner Country Effects
All our regressions to this point have assumed identical treaty effects across new treaty partner
countries, which may mask important heterogeneity across these new partner countries.  Table 9 explores
this by estimating the first differences model for outbound FDI stock with individual treaty-year dummies
for each separate partner country.  Except for Morocco, we estimate negative treaty effects for all
countries.  These negative effects are statistically significant for China, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea,
22 The BEA also reports net income which may be of particular interest.  However, it is not clear
that the M-M framework is appropriate for modeling FDI income flows, rather than FDI activity.  In
addition, since the reported variable is net income, there are endogeneity issues with our tax treaty
variable, that may be difficult to control. 
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Phillippines, and Spain.  Thus, there is heterogeneity in treaty effects across countries, but negative
coefficients are prevalent.  Columns (2) and (3) give two metric by which to judge the magnitude of these
effects: FDI stock in the treaty year and average FDI stock during the sample.  The estimated treaty
effects seem reasonable in magnitude across the countries, with the exception of Cyprus, which is has a
coefficient that is imprecisely estimated.
  E. Alternative Dependent Variables 
In addition to data on affiliate sales and FDI stock, there also exists BEA data on FDI flows and
numbers of affiliates, which may be reasonably modeled by the empirical specification we use here.22 
FDI flows are generally reported for the same number of years as the FDI stock and are obviously highly
correlated as changes in FDI stock are exactly these FDI flows.   In fact, our specifications above
employing FDI stock and controlling for country-specific fixed effects and trends (or alternatively, in first
differences) was essentially yielding estimates from net changes in FDI stock.  Thus, it is not surprising
that using the same M-M empirical framework to model these FDI flows we find qualitatively similar
results with respect to new treaty partner effects.
Examining the effect of new treaties on number of affiliates is interesting, because to this point
we cannot discern if the negative effect of new treaties on FDI activity stems from purely reductions
(smaller increases) in FDI activity by existing firms, or if it also includes exits (less entry).  Using number
of affiliates as our dependent variable in the same M-M framework (both in levels and first differences),
we estimate negative coefficients for both outbound and inbound, though in neither case are they
statistically significant.  We do not report the results on FDI flows or the number of affiliates here for
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brevity, but they are available upon request.
IV.  Conclusion
This paper estimates the effects of bilateral treaties governing the taxation of FDI for the first
time.  Though we our sample covers the most comprehensive set of countries and years to date, the data
constraints allow us to only credibly estimate the effects of U.S. bilateral tax treaties that were
implemented  in the 1970s and 1980s, which we call “new” treaties.  Generally, we find insignificant, or
even negative, effects of these treaties on FDI activity, particularly with respect to outbound FDI activity. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that tax treaties are intended to reduce tax evasion rather than
promote new investment.  This idea suggests that one might expect a decrease in FDI activity because the
treaty drives out firms who were undertaking investment primarily for tax reasons.  Given the finding that
the drop in FDI growth occurs right around the time a new treaty is put into place, this hypothesis seems
especially apt.  Finally, it is important to note that this period of U.S. bilateral treaty activity is likely
quite different from the treaties it signed with more established countries in the decade after WWII, so it
is not clear that our results generalize to that period.  
In closing, we wish to highlight that our estimation results in the paper go through a deliberate
sequence of empirical specifications for two reasons.  First, since this is the first time these effects have
been estimated, we felt it was important to begin with the most basic specifications and then build off of
them.  Second, many “dirty” data issues suggested useful modifications of the baseline approach.  In the
process of exploring these alternative specifications, we found that assuming a common coefficient on M-
M model’s control variables for rich and poor partner countries is incorrect.  This result occurs despite the
model’s skilled-labor interaction terms that are intended to capture rich and poor partner country
differences.  This suggests a need for further work to develop an empirical model that more adequately
fits heterogeneous country pairs.  We also found that time series properties cannot be ignored when using
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panel data of FDI activity across countries.  Thus, there remains a great deal to be explored in the area of
tax treaties and FDI, and it is our hope that this paper provides a stimulus for future research.
25
Table 1: List of U.S. Tax Treaties.
Aruba (1986-1996) India (1990-) Phillippines (1977-)
Australia (1953-) Indonesia (1989-) Poland (1976-)
Austria (1956-) Ireland (1952-) Portugal (1994-)
Barbados (1984-) Israel (1993-) Romania (1976-)
Belgium (1948-) Italy (1955-) Russia (1993-)
Canada (1941-) Jamaica (1981-) Trinidad and Tobago (1971-)
China (1985-) Japan (1954-) Slovak Republic (1994-)
Cyprus (1988-) Kazakhstan (1993-) South Africa (1953-1987, 1997-)
Czech Republic (1995-) Korea, Republic of (1977-) Spain (1991-)
Denmark (1948-) Luxembourg (1963-) Sweden (1940-)
Egypt (1981-) Malta (1981-1997) Switzerland (1951-)
Finland (1952-) Mexico (1993-) Tunisia (1986-)
France (1940-) Morocco (1978-) Turkey (1997-)
Germany (1954-)* Netherlands (1949-) Ukraine (1994-)
Greece (1965-) Netherlands Antilles (1948-1987) United Kingdom (1945-)
Honduras (1956-1966) New Zealand (1948-) U.S.S.R. (1977-1992)**
Hungary (1980-) Norway (1951-)
Iceland (1976-) Pakistan (1958-)
NOTES: * Extended to cover reunified Germany 1990.  ** Treaty provisions extended to former
members until individual treaties can be negotiated.
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Table 2: Expected Signs of Independent Variables in Markusen-Maskus Empirical Framework.
Independent Variables Expected Signs 
  
  SUMGDP  +      if Horizontal or Knowledge-Capital MNE models
 0      if Vertical MNE model
  GDPDIFSQ  -      if Horizontal or Knowledge-Capital MNE models
 0     if Vertical MNE model
  D2SKDGDPD  -      if Knowledge-Capital MNE model
 0     if Horizontal or Vertical MNE models
  D2SKDSUMG  +     if Vertical or Knowledge-Capital MNE models     
 -      if Horizontal MNE model
 D1SKDSUMG  0     if Vertical or Knowledge-Capital MNE models     
 -      if Horizontal MNE model
 DISTANCE  ?
  T_OPENi  -       if Vertical or Knowledge-Capital MNE models                    
0      if Horizontal MNE model 
  T_OPENj  +
  F_OPENj  +
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Table 3: Relative Rank of New U.S. Bilateral Tax Treaty Countries in U.S. Outward FDI Position in the
Year the Treaty is Enacted, 1972-1992.
Year Country
Rank of Country in Terms of
U.S. Outward FDI Stock (Out of
Approximately 70 Countries)
Number of Countries Ahead





No FDI data available













1978 Morocco 48th 29














No FDI data available
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NA
1988 Cyprus 56th 32
1989 Indonesia 18th 6
1990 India 37th 14
1991 Spain 13th 3
NOTES: FDI data may not be available for a number of reasons, but it is often due to such small volume
that it would reveal proprietary information on individual investing firms.  NA denotes “Not Applicable.”
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Table 4: Estimates of treaty effects on U.S. INBOUND and OUTBOUND AFFILIATE SALES.
   Dependent Variables and Empirical Models
Affiliate Sales Inbound Affiliate Sales Outbound




- 4138.1    





(1445.2)    
  
  
NEW TREATY - 16534.3** 
(5766.9)    
- 9703.4** 
(3087.7)    
- 5343.5** 
(1224.1)    
- 2509.68*    
(1023.0)     
OLD TREATY  4991.6     
(3557.5)    
   19061.6** 
(2118.5)    
   
M-M Controls:
SUMGDPij 45.018**  
(10.740)     
45.431**  
(10.469)     
78.988**  
(11.990)     
44.380**  
(7.251)      
41.191**  
(6.815)     
69.187**   
(10.288)     
GDPDIFSQij - 3.565**  
(1.310)    
- 3.419**  
(1.284)     
- 7.416**  
(1.386)     
- 8.790**  
(1.016)     
- 8.240**  
(0.954)     
- 9.720**  
(1.514)     
D2SKDGDPDij    - 1043.5*    
(512.67)     
   - 990.84*    
(497.85)     
   - 748.10**  
(232.24)     
 - 6.730**  
(0.959)     
 - 6.148      
(0.864)     
 - 11.470      
(2.204)     
D2SKDSUMGij - 1037.9*    
(505.68)    
- 985.46*    
(491.04)     
- 734.06**  
(229.19)     
- 6.956**  
(0.929)     
- 6.122      
(0.838)     
- 11.875      
(0.571)     
D1SKDSUMGij - 2.069**  
(0.269)     
- 1.671**  
(0.237)     
- 4.989**  
(0.797)     
- 3.121**  
(0.596)     
- 3.703**  
(0.644)     
- 1.198**  
(0.571)     
DISTij - 1.245**  
(0.435)     
- 1.016**  
(0.441)     
  
  
- 2.643**  
(0.460)     
- 2.465**  
(0.419)     
F_OPEN    
 
   
 
   
 
 20878**  
    (4679.5)    
 23934.6**
    (5422.2)    
  2745.6      
    (3054.1)     
T_OPENi  - 16.039     
(14.099)    
 - 14.045     
(14.074)    
 - 31.409     
(27.836)    
2478.8      
 (1640.8)     
2196.3      
(1570.4)     
2431.5**  










 (15.384)  
- 53.236**  
(18.327)     
R-squared 0.63       0.65       0.98       0.68      0.71       0.99       
F Test  24.96**   24.97**   15.15**   27.62**   37.55**   22.99**  
Sample Size  396        396        396         556        556         556       
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-
tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5: Estimates of treaty effects on U.S. INBOUND and OUTBOUND FDI STOCK.
   Dependent Variables and Empirical Models
FDI Stock Inbound FDI Stock Outbound




789.18     





(430.94)    
  
  
NEW TREATY - 3737.6** 
(1062.1)    
- 9279.3** 
(1927.8)    
- 1686.9** 
(423.74)    
- 879.94**  
(192.41)     
OLD TREATY  3748.2** 
(857.16)    
   5180.4** 
(535.78)    
   
M-M Controls:
SUMGDPij 7.460**  
(2.190)     
6.773**  
(2.144)     
29.015**  
(3.981)     
10.032**  
(1.596)    
9.157**  
(1.535)     
10.140**  
(1.208)     
GDPDIFSQij - 1.128**  
(0.337)     
- 1.187**  
(0.329)     
- 3.192**  
(0.522)     
- 1.048** 
(0.211)    
- 0.960**  
(0.204)     
- 1.017**  
(0.134)     
D2SKDGDPDij    - 283.31      
(332.63)     
   - 294.15      
(323.30)     
   - 95.162      
(85.443)     
 - 0.763** 
(0.219)     
- 0.661**  
(0.201)     
 - 0.948**  
(0.223)     
D2SKDSUMGij - 281.14      
(328.16)     
- 291.84      
(318.95)     
- 92.699      
(84.299)     
- 0.894**  
(0.217)     
- 0.725**  
(0.199)     
- 1.032      
(0.233)     
D1SKDSUMGij - 0.384**   
(0.058)      
- 0.278**   
(0.050)      
- 1.186**   
(0.177)      
- 0.738**  
(0.092)     
- 0.798**  
(0.095)     
- 0.313**  
(0.059)     
DISTij - 0.428**   
(0.096)      
- 0.373**   
(0.093)      
   
   
- 1.021**  
(0.128)     
- 1.008**  
(0.124)     
  
  
F_OPEN    
 
   
 
   
 
6085.7**  
(1643.0)    
6657.3**  
(1735.2)     
- 369.04      
(1173.9)     
T_OPENi  3.827       
(4.212)      
 4.240       
(4.183)      
 - 17.882      
(12.277)     
- 16.720      
(126.37)     
- 5.307      
(124.67)     
4.065      
(27.018)     
T_OPENj 263.19  
(258.39)   
306.07  
(255.55)   
313.45*







R-squared 0.37       0.39       0.90       0.36      0.38       0.96       
F Test  13.22**    13.49**    10.93**    23.85**   33.36**   39.50**  
Sample Size  731        731        731        1355       1355        1355       
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-
tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6: Estimates of treaty effects on U.S. INBOUND and OUTBOUND AFFILIATE SALES.
   Dependent Variables and Empirical Models


















NEW TREATY - 525.98      
(1046.8)     
- 91.486       
(138.46)      
- 55.52      
(271.86)     
- 1090.1       
(781.75)      
- 1115.7       
(720.6)      
- 383.54       
(417.80)      
M-M Controls:
SUMGDPij 53.632**   
(14.356)      
2.614        
(3.047)       
8.714*     
(3.775)      
37.284*     
(16.982)      
- 20.169        
(13.913)       
- 11.461       
(11.326)      
GDPDIFSQij          - 4.846** 
     (1.503)      
          0.069
         (0.177)
- 0.202       
(0.147)      
- 5.672**   
(2.178)      
 1.970        
(1.812)       
1.675       
(1.406)      
D2SKDGDPDij  410.51       
(479.58)      
  - 106.17        
(491.10)       
- 284.72       
(273.44)      
- 1.718       
(2.386)      
  - 5.666*      
(2.560)       
3.373       
(2.050)      
D2SKDSUMGij  403.85       
(471.73)      
 - 105.92        
(483.16)       
- 281.32       
(269.51)      
- 1.415       
(2.466)      
 - 6.312*      
(2.647)       
2.745       
(2.046)      
D1SKDSUMGij - 3.171**   
(0.812)      
- 0.609        
(0.443)       
- 0.779       
(0.465)      
 - 0.776       
(0.494)      
 - 3.659*      
(1.528)       
- 1.192       
(1.466)      
F_OPEN    
  
   
  
- 4455.7       
(3964.1)      
- 12165*      
   (5175.1)      
- 5440.4       
(3701.4)      
T_OPENi  0.215       
(19.025)      
- 2.326        
(5.068)       
- 2.930       
(5.547)      
2083.2**   
(360.14)      
201.11        
(225.21)       
406.62**   
(138.57)      
T_OPENj  1653.7**    
(329.39)      
 120.72        
(83.807)       
229.30*     
(104.21)      
- 58.383*     
 (24.452)      
- 12.817        
(23.142)       
- 8.775       
(10.483)      
SUMGDPij ×
RICH COUNTRY
102.19**    
(30.584)       
90.940**   
(15.509)      
81.567**    
(28.969)       
52.066**   
(16.042)      
GDPDIFSQij ×
RICH COUNTRY
- 13.024**    
(3.981)       
- 11.309**   
(2.219)      
- 12.001**    
(4.035)       
- 8.100**   
(2.179)      
F_OPEN × RICH
COUNTRY
56045*      
(25279)      
23503       
(15522)      
T_OPENi × RICH
COUNTRY
86.980        
(67.805)       
120.74*    
(58.230)     
3991.3**    
(831.66)       
2513.5**   




2860.1**    
(604.9)       
1660.1**  
(467.01)    
- 297.99*      
(99.074)       
- 193.97**   
(65.984)      
R-squared 0.997       0.998        0.559      0.995       0.996         0.245       
F Test  27.23**     39.81**    7.31**    16.95**    23.21**     4.18**   
Sample Size  396         396        337        556        556         464       
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-
tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 7: Estimates of treaty effects on U.S. INBOUND and OUTBOUND FDI STOCK.
   Dependent Variables and Empirical Models


















NEW TREATY - 847.47      
(582.56)     
96.662       
(77.107)      
 59.387       
(108.92)      
- 225.23       
(181.06)      
- 132.86       
(163.95)      
- 188.04*    
(81.812)     
M-M Controls:
SUMGDPij 30.202**   
(9.125)      
 0.052       
(0.892)      
0.410       
(1.011)      
3.596*     
(0.002)      
- 2.568**   
(0.635)      
- 0.079       
(0.828)      
GDPDIFSQij        - 3.311**   
   (1.070)      
      - 0.034        
       (0.043)
- 0.043       
(0.035)      
 0.125       
(0.150)      
  0.437**    
(0.075)      
0.064       
(0.098)      
D2SKDGDPDij  214.69**   
(61.924)      
- 27.465       
(99.770)      
55.248      
(68.531)     
 1.411**   
(0.239)      
 1.423**   
(0.203)      
0.492**   
(0.156)      
D2SKDSUMGij  211.41**   
(60.958)      
 - 26.830       
(98.157)      
54.737      
(67.705)     
 0.870**   
(0.237)      
 1.263**   
(0.046)      
0.408**   
(0.164)      
D1SKDSUMGij - 1.066**   
(0.276)      
 0.014       
(0.135)      
- 0.187      
(0.136)     
- 0.281       
(0.153)      
 - 0.372       
(0.197)      
0.022       
(0.140)      
F_OPEN    
  
   
  
- 1358.4       
(799.11)      
- 1974.6**   
(551.77)      
- 2987.6**   
(804.84)      
T_OPENi  8.067       
(6.313)      
1.960*     
(0.807)      
0.497      
(1.186)     
109.13**   
(25.649)      
41.434       
(11.739)      
1.310       
(12.286)      
T_OPENj  209.54       
(60.090)      
- 1.510       
(10.623)      
59.387      
(36.073)     
- 16.804       
 (3.416)      
- 4.304**   
 (1.440)      
- 0.842       
(1.375)      
SUMGDPij ×
RICH COUNTRY
67.475**   
(18.325)      
41.786**  
(6.461)     
13.751**   
(2.647)      
7.218**    
(1.693)       
GDPDIFSQij ×
RICH COUNTRY
- 9.310**   
   (2.513)      
- 5.461**   
(0.924)      
- 1.464**   
(0.324)      
- 0.931**    
(0.246)       
F_OPEN × RICH
COUNTRY
13014.0**   
(3913.9)      
- 6572.8        
(3499.3)       
T_OPENi × RICH
COUNTRY
- 3.385      
(25.456)     
- 16.846      
(26.094)     
344.37**   
(68.174)      
306.07**    




474.03      
(144.29)     
82.202      
(196.12)     
- 104.21**   
 (20.882)      
- 44.871**   
(14.371)      
R-squared 0.981       0.985        0.335      0.986       0.987       0.168       
F Test  16.86**     21.75**    4.75**   33.04**   42.68**   8.88**   
Sample Size  731         731        640        1355        1355       1257       
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** and * denoting statistical significance (two-
tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Estimates of treaty effects on U.S. INBOUND and OUTBOUND AFFILIATE SALES and
FDI STOCK.
   Dependent Variables and Empirical Models
Affiliate Sales FDI Stock
Regressors Inbound Outbound Inbound Outbound
TREATY_-3  74.572     
(178.39)    
- 626.84     
(872.68)    
 - 14.105      
(35.530)     
- 107. 31      
(159.57)     
TREATY_-2 - 74.478     
(126.93)    
- 350.95     
(802.37)    
- 22.283      
(60.216)     
- 5.460      
(149.97)     
TREATY_-1 77.564     
(135.49)    
 374.11     
(930.14)    
 21.494      
(47.912)     
- 58.457      
(136.83)     
TREATY YEAR - 13.252     
(277.94)    
- 432.36     
(439.71)    
52.187      
(112.88)     
- 192.71*    
(83.257)     
TREATY_+1 117.49     
(174.88)    
- 280.54     
(407.19)    
- 266.45*    
(114.55)     
- 3.090      
(42.731)     
TREATY_+2     53.412     
(191.38)    
- 385.29 #  
(211.42)    
   - 59.452      
(81.804)     
49.228      
(46.249)     
TREATY_+3  303.57     
(258.83)    
- 482.16 #  
(275.43)    
5.347      
(53.815)     
- 88.825       
(62.869)      
TREATY_+4 617.73** 
(145.92)    
- 354.25*   
(161.73)    
- 71.642      
(60.355)     
- 69.752       
(37.319)      
TREATY_+5 586.54** 
(199.24)    
- 54.373     
(418.14)    
- 56.688      
(75.327)     
- 72.347       
(56.292)      
R-squared 0.560     0.246       0.336       0.168        
F Test  3.39**  2.81**    3.03**    6.29**    
Sample Size  337       464        640        1257        
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** , *, and # denoting statistical significance
(two-tailed test) at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 9: Treaty effects on U.S. OUTBOUND FDI STOCK by new treaty partner country.
New treaty countries
(treaty year)
Estimated new treaty year
effects from first
 differences specification




CHINA (1985)               - 642.63**
  
             322.00               205.51    
CYPRUS (1988)                 - 56.57                14.59                 25.79    
EGYPT (1981)                 - 68.44*            1286.03               973.01  
ICELAND (1976)                     N.A.                  8.81                 10.09
INDIA (1990)                     N.A.              312.11               547.97
INDONESIA (1989)               - 569.98**            2425.40             2127.14
KOREA (1977)               - 138.52**              654.00               966.49     
MOROCCO (1978)                   20.99                61.73                 55.27
PHILIPPINES (1977)                 - 83.83*            1385.82             1428.06
SPAIN (1991)               - 115.81*            6601.22             3269.46
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses, with ** and *denoting statistical significance (two-
tailed test) at the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
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BEA Data on FDI Activity
The FDI activity data reported by the BEA is subject to two types of censorship.  First, if
revealing the bilateral FDI activity would reveal the information of a single firm, only this information is
reported due to confidentiality requirements.  These observations were dropped.  Second, if the FDI
activity lies between -$500,000 and $500,000, only this information is given.  These observations were
set to zero.  This censorship then left us with an unbalanced panel which covered different time periods
for different activity measures.  Outbound FDI stocks and outbound flows were at most available from
1966-1992 while their inbound counterparts were available from 1980-1992.  Outbound sales data for
1983-1992 was obtained.  Inbound sales covered the period 1984-1992.  All measures are for non-
financial institutions and can be found at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/di1.htm.
Tax Treaties
Information on tax data all came from the tax treaties themselves as reported by Diamond and
Diamond (1998).  Treaty effectiveness dates were based on when they actually became effective as
opposed to when they were signed.  If a treaty initially became effective before July 1 year, it was
considered effective in that year.  Otherwise, it was coded so that it was initially effective in the following
year.  Similar coding was used for treaty termination dates.  
Other Data
Our GDP (both total and per capita) and trade openness measures are those from version 5.6 of
the Penn-World Tables, which are available online at http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca:5680/pwt/.  For a
detail discussion of these measures, see Summers and Heston (1991).
Our education variable is the mean years of education for both males and females.  This data is
published by the World Bank and is discussed by Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993).  The availability of this
variable was the cause of the difference in the number of observations between the gravity and M-M
specifications. 
Distance was measure as the distance between capital cities as reported by the Bali Online
Corporation.  This distance calculator can be found at http://www.indo.com.
FDI openness was calculated as the U.S. dollar value of FDI stock divided by a country’s GDP. 
FDI stock data were collected from United Nations’ World Investment Directory published in various
volumes over various years in the 1990s.  Official statistics on FDI stock vary considerably and, in fact,
are not available for many countries. In these cases FDI stock was estimated (both by the UN and us) by
cumulating FDI flows from as early a year as possible. An appendix that details source and method of
FDI stock data estimation for each country is available from the authors upon request.   Nominal GDP
figures were taken from the International Monetary Fund (2000). 
Descriptive Statistics of Data
The countries in our cross-section, as well as the availability of education data, are reported in
Table A1. Summary statistics for the entire data set are reported in Table A2. 
Table A1: Countries used in at least one estimation specification.
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Australia Finland Luxembourg Rwanda
Austria France Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Germany Malawi Singapore
Belgium Ghana Malaysia Spain
Bolivia Guatemala Mauritius Sri Lanka
Brazil Honduras Mexico Sweden
Cameroon Iceland Morocco Switzerland
Canada India Mozambique Thailand
Chile Indonesia Netherlands Tunisia
China Iran New Zealand Turkey
Colombia Ireland Nigeria Uganda
Costa Rica Israel Norway United Kingdom
Cyprus Italy Pakistan Uruguay
Denmark Ivory Coast Panama Venezuela
Ecuador Japan Paraguay Zimbabwe
Egypt Kenya Peru
El Salvador Korea Phillippines
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics for entire data set.
Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations
Affiliate Sales-Out 14054.18 1478.203 32013.72 0 179958.7 702
Affiliate Sales-In 16149.98 712.3074 40105.73 0 267401.3 425
FDI Stock-out 3282.979 402.8901 8381.612 -1145.187 66888.71 1851
FDI Stock-in 3385.721 23.61482 11173.48 -119.4962 90554.57 811
RGDP 120370.7 26717.76 235926.9 445.816 1873020 2075
RGDP-US 3453398 3463851 680976.1 2391005 4575975 2106
SUMGDP 3567807 3513959 755915.9 2391482 6448995 2075
GDPDIFSQ 1.15e+13 1.09e+13 4.72e+12 3.59e+12 2.09e+13 2075
D2SKDGDPD-In -133908.8 0 1139478 -1.26e+07 0 1736
D2SKDSUMG-In 135530 0 1152893 0 1.27e+07 1736
D1SKDSUMG-In 2.00e+07 1.97e+07 9638812 0 4.61e+07 1736
D2SKDGDPD-Out 1.88e+07 1.86e+07 9249375 0 4.34e+07 1736
D2SKDSUMG-Out 2.00e+07 1.97e+07 9638812 0 4.61e+07 1736
D1SKDSUMG-Out 135530 0 115289. 0 1.27e+07 1736
DISTANCE 5450.987 5258.5 2347.104 455 10163 2106
F_OPEN 30983689 .0574711 .1581039 -.2295737 3.419681 1676
OPEN-US 16.73185 17.8 3.967776 9.86 21.9 2106
OPEN-FOREIGN 62.51847 52.855 46.10281 4.99 423.41 2106
TREATY .2962963 0 .4567317 0 1 2106
